

## Message Text

SECRET

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ACTION SS-25

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FM USMISSION GENEVA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3081  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 GENEVA 12243

EXDIS USCTB

PASS TO DOE

E.O. 11652: XGDS-3  
TAGS: PARM US UK UR  
SUBJECT: CTB NEGOTIATIONS: SOVIET COMMENTS ON NSS

CTB MESSAGE NO.290

1. SUMMARY: IN AN INFORMAL DISCUSSION WITH NEIDLE AND FINCH (US), TIMERBAEV AND TARASOV (USSR) CLARIFIED THE SOVIET STANCE ON SEVERAL ASPECTS OF NATIONAL SEISMIC STATIONS (NSS). TIMERBAEV SAID SOVIET DEL'S DESIRE WAS TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN WORKING OUT COMPOSITE TEXT REFLECTING AREAS WHERE WE ARE IN AGREEMENT ON NSS. HE SAID THAT "FOR VITAL POLICY REASONS" THE SOVIETS COULD NOT AGREE TO THE USE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS TO EXCHANGE SEISMIC DATA. IF THE US COULD ACCEPT THE USE OF MAGNETIC TAPES, THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS NSS EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS FOR INCLUSION IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. TARASOV REVEALED THAT THE SOVIETS WERE DEVELOPING THEIR OWN SEISMIC EQUIPMENT; HE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO  
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REACH AGREEMENT ON NSS CHARACTERISTICS AND NOTED THAT IF SOVIET EQUIPMENT MET THOSE CHARACTERISTICS, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR AUTHORITIES WHY THEY SHOULD USE OUR EQUIPMENT. TARASOV THOUGHT THERE COULD BE NSS INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES IN THE SEPARATE AGREEMENT BUT THEY SHOULD BE GENERAL IN NATURE. END SUMMARY.

2. NEIDLE AND FINCH (US) MET INFORMALLY WITH TIMERBAEV AND TARASOV (USSR) ON AUGUST 8, AT TIMERBAEV'S INVITATION, TO DISCUSS APPROACHES TO FACILITATING WORK ON NATIONAL SEISMIC STATION (NSS) ISSUES. TIMERBAEV OPENED THE DISCUSSION BY STATING THAT THE SOVIET DEL DESIRES TO MAKE AS MUCH PROGRESS AS POSSIBLE IN WORKING OUT COMPOSITE TEXT FOR THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT REFLECTING AREAS WHERE WE ARE IN AGREEMENT ON NSS. IN THIS CONNECTION, HE ASKED WHAT THE US SIDE SAW AS THE MOST IMPORTANT NSS ISSUES REMAINING TO BE RESOLVED. NEIDLE AND FINCH CITED NSS NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS; SPECIFICATION OF EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS; SITE SELECTION, INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES; AND THE METHOD OF DATA TRANSMISSION. TIMERBAEV SAID THAT, FOR THE SOVIETS, DATA TRANSMISSION IS A KEY QUESTION. FOR VITAL POLICY REASONS, THE USE OF SATELLITE COMMUNICATIONS WAS NOT ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS. FINCH ASKED WHETHER THIS SITUATION MIGHT CHANGE AT SOME FUTURE TIME; TIMERBAEV SAID THE POSSIBILITY COULD BE CONSIDERED. AFTER CONSULTATION WITH TARASOV, TIMERBAEV SAID THAT IF THE US COULD ACCEPT THE USE OF MAGNETIC TAPES TO EXCHANGE NSS DATA, THE SOVIETS WOULD DISCUSS EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS FOR INCLUSION IN THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT. NEIDLE RESPONDED THAT IT WASN'T POSSIBLE TO SERIOUSLY CONSIDER A PROPOSAL THAT WE AGREE TO A CHANGE IN APPROACH ON THE METHOD OF DATA SECRET

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TRANSMISSION IN RETURN FOR THE SOVIETS AGREEING TO "CONSIDER" STATION CHARACTERISTICS. TIMERBAEV SAID THIS WAS A FAIR POINT. HE SUGGESTED THAT THE QUESTION BE DISCUSSED AGAIN SOON; AT THAT TIME HE MIGHT SKETCH OUT WHAT THE SOVIETS WERE THINKING.

3. NEIDLE SAID THAT, IN RELATION TO EQUIPMENT CHARACTERISTICS, USE OF THE EQUIPMENT BEING DEVELOPED BY THE US WOULD BE THE SIMPLEST AND MOST PRACTICAL APPROACH. THIS WAS AN AREA WHERE THE US HAD A BIG HEADSTART. WE WERE MUCH FURTHER ALONG THAN THE SOVIETS IN DEVELOPING SEISMIC EQUIPMENT SPECIFICALLY INTENDED FOR TEST BAN MONITORING, AND IT SEEMED APPROPRIATE TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THIS US EFFORT. TIMERBAEV AND TARASOV ACKNOWLEDGED THAT WE WERE AHEAD, BUT TARASOV STATED THAT THE SOVIETS HAD INITIATED THEIR OWN PROGRAM TO DEVELOP SEISMIC EQUIPMENT FOR THIS PURPOSE. NEIDLE SAID THAT THE US EQUIPMENT WOULD BE AVAILABLE FOR OPERATIONAL DEPLOYMENT ON A TIMETABLE CONSISTENT WITH SEPARATE AGREEMENT REQUIREMENTS; HE ASKED WHAT THE SOVIETS ENVISIONED REGARDING THE SCHEDULE OF DEVELOPMENT OF THEIR EQUIPMENT. TARASOV RESPONDED THAT IT WOULD BE READY WHEN THE TIME CAME TO INSTALL IMPROVED

EQUIPMENT UNDER THE SEPARATE VERIFICATION AGREEMENT.  
NEIDLE AND FINCH AGAIN REVIEWED THE ADVANTAGES OF USING US  
EQUIPMENT, OBSERVING THAT IT WAS IN BOTH COUNTRIES'  
INTERESTS TO EMPLOY THE BEST AVAILABLE NSS EQUIPMENT.  
TARASOV RESPONDED THAT HE THOUGHT WE WOULD BE ABLE TO  
REACH AGREEMENT ON TECHNICAL CHARACTERISTICS; IF THE  
SOVIET EQUIPMENT SATISFIED THOSE CHARACTERISTICS, IT WOULD  
BE DIFFICULT FOR THEM TO EXPLAIN TO THEIR AUTHORITIES WHY  
THEY WERE USING OUR EQUIPMENT INSTEAD.

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S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 02 GENEVA 12243

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PASS TO DOE

4. ON THE QUESTION OF INSTALLATION AND MAINTENANCE  
PROCEDURES, FINCH REVIEWED THE KEY ELEMENTS OF THE US  
PROPOSAL, STRESSING THE NEED FOR PARTICIPATION OF EXPERTS  
FROM BOTH COUNTRIES WHEN DOWNHOLE EQUIPMENT WAS BEING  
INSTALLED OR SERVICED. NEIDLE CHARACTERIZED THIS AS A  
VERY NATURAL PROCEDURE INVOLVING JOINT US-USSR PARTICI-  
PATION SO THAT BOTH PARTIES COULD BE ASSURED THAT WHAT  
SHOULD BE DONE WAS BEING DONE. TIMERBAEV AND TARASOV SAID  
THAT THE SOVIET SIDE INTENDED THAT SUCH JOINT ACTIVITIES  
WOULD TAKE PLACE. TARASOV THOUGHT PROCEDURES COULD BE  
WORKED OUT, BUT THEY SHOULD BE GENERAL IN NATURE. JOHNSON

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## Message Attributes

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